Skip to main content
Log in

Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect

  • Focus
  • Published:
Soft Computing Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

One of the founders of social choice theory, Marquis de Condorcet, assigned truth degrees to propositions expressing preferences over options. Although his work is often discussed in terms of probability theory, it is arguable that his truth degree lends itself to a more natural interpretation as a fuzzy preference. We shall review some of Condorcet’s results in the light of this interpretation. The first twentieth century applications of fuzzy concepts to social choice appeared rather shortly after the introduction by L. A. Zadeh of the concept of fuzzy binary relation in early 1970s. The early applications dealt with experimental anomalies and their accountability with the aid of fuzzy preference relations and fuzzy goal states. Considerable literature now exists on various solution concepts in fuzzy voting games and many important theorems of traditional social choice theory have found their counterpart in fuzzy social choice. The natural next step would seem to be the design of fuzzy mechanisms and institutions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aleskerov F (2005) The history of social choice in Russia and Soviet Union. Soc Choice Welfare 25:419–431

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow K (1951) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven (1963, 1st edn.)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Banks J (1985) Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Soc Choice Welfare 1:295–306

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett CR, Pattanaik PK, Salles M (1992) Rationality and aggregation of preferences in an ordinally fuzzy framework. Fuzzy Sets Syst 49:9–13

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Ben-Yashar R, Paroush J (2000) A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 17:189–199

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Bezdek J, Spillman B, Spillman R (1978) A fuzzy relation space for group decision theory. Fuzzy Sets Syst 1:255–268

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Bezdek J, Spillman B, Spillman R (1979) Fuzzy relation spaces for group decision theory: an application. Fuzzy Sets Syst 2:5–14

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Bezembinder Th, Van Acker P (1985) The Ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice. J Math Sociol 11:131–158

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Billot A (1998) Elements of fuzzy game theory. In: Słowinski R (ed) Fuzzy sets in decision analysis. Operations research and statistics. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Black D (1948a) On the rationale of group decision making. J Polit Econ 56:23–34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black D (1948b) The decisions of a committee using a special majority. Econometrica 16:245–261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black D (1958) Theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Blin J (1974) Fuzzy relation in group decision theory. J Cybern 4:17–22

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Butnariu D (1978) Fuzzy games: a description of the concept. Fuzzy Sets and Syst 1:181–192

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Butnariu D (1987) Values and cores of fuzzy games with infinitely many players. Int J Game Theory 16:43–68

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Chiclana F, Herrera F, Herrera-Viedma E, Martinez L (2003) A note on the reciprocity in the aggregation of fuzzy preference relations using OWA operators. Fuzzy Sets Syst 137:71–83

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Dubois D, Koning J-L (1991) Social choice axioms for fuzzy set aggegation. Fuzzy Sets Syst 43:257–274

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Dutta B (1987) Fuzzy preferences and social choice. Math Soc Sci 13:215–229

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina M, Plott Ch (1978) Committee decisions under majority rule: an experimental study. Am Polit Sci Rev 72:575–595

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fung LW, Fu KS (1975) An axiomatic approach to rational decision making in a fuzzy environment. In: Zadeh LA, King-Sum F, Tanaka K, Shimura M (eds) Fuzzy sets and their applications to cognitive and decision processes. Academic Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica 41:587–601

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Grabisch M (2006) Representation of preferences over a finite scale by a mean operator. Math Soc Sci 52:131–151

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi J, Selten R (1988) A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press, Cambridge

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Herrera F, Herrera-Viedma E, Verdegay JL (1996) Direct approach processes in group decision making using OWA operators. Fuzzy Sets Syst 79:175–190

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Intriligator M (1973) A probabilistic model of social choice. Rev Econ Stud 40:553–560

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Intriligator M (1982) Probabilistic models of choice. Math Soc Sci 2:157–166

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Kacprzyk J, Fedrizzi M (1988) A “soft” measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences. Eur J Oper Res 34:316–325

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Kacprzyk J, Fedrizzi M, Nurmi H (1992) Group decision making and consensus under fuzzy preferences and fuzzy majority. Fuzzy Sets Syst 49:21–31

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Kelly J (1991) Social choice bibliography. Soc Choice Welfare 8: 97–169

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitainik L, Orlovsky S, Roubens M (1993) Expert assistant FICCKAS: fuzzy information cluster, choice and knowledge acquisition system. Fuzzy Sets Syst 58:105–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kramer G (1977) A dynamical model of political equilibrium. J Econ Theory 16:310–334

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey R (1976) Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and implications for agenda control. J Econ Theory 12:472–482

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey R (1979) General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47:1085–1112

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • McLean I, Urken A (eds) (1995) Classics of social choice. Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom P (2004) Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller N (1986) Information, electorates, and democracy. In: Grofman B, Owen G (eds) Information pooling and group decision making. JAI Press, Greenwich

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller N (1995) Committees, agendas, and voting. Harwood Academic, Chur

    Google Scholar 

  • Monjardet B (1990) Sur diverses formes de la “Règle de Condorcet” d’agrégation des préférences. Math Inform Sci Hum 111:61–71

    MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Montero J (1985) A note on Fung-Fu’s theorem. Fuzzy Sets Syst 17:259–269

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Montero J (1988) Aggregation of fuzzy opinions in a non-homogeneous group. Fuzzy Sets Syst 25:15–20

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Montero J (1994) Rational aggregation rules. Fuzzy Sets Syst 62: 267–276

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Montero J, Tejada J (1986) Some problems on the definition of fuzzy preference relations. Fuzzy Sets Syst 20:45–53

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Moulin H (1988) Choosing from a tournament. Soc Choice Welfare 3:271–291

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Nanson EJ (1882) Methods of election. Trans Proc R Soc Vic XIX:197–240. Reprinted in McLean

  • Nurmi H (1978) On fuzzy games. In: Progress in cybernetics and systems research, vol IV. Hemisphere, Vienna

  • Nurmi H (1981a) A fuzzy solution to a majority voting game. Fuzzy Sets Syst 5:187–198

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H (1981b) Approaches to collective decision making with fuzzy preference relations. Fuzzy Sets Syst 6:249–259

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H (1984) Probabilistic voting: a fuzzy interpretation and extension. Polit Methodol 10:81–95

    Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H (1993) Problems in the theory of institutional design: an overview. J Theor Polit 5:523–540

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H (1999) Voting paradoxes and how to deal with them. Springer, Heidelberg

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H (2001) Resolving group choice paradoxes using probabilistic and fuzzy concepts. Group Decis Negotiat 10:177–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H (2002) Voting procedures under uncertainty. Springer, Heidelberg

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H, Kacprzyk J (1991) On fuzzy tournaments and their solution concepts in group decision making. Eur J Oper Res 51:223–232

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi H, Fedrizzi M, Kacprzyk J (1990) Vague notions in the theory of voting. In: Kacprzyk J, Fedrizzi M (eds) Multiperson decision making using fuzzy sets and possibility theory. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Orlovsky S (1978) Decision-making with fuzzy preference relation. Fuzzy Sets Syst 1:155–167

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Osborne M, Rubinstein A (1994) A course in game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrogorski M (1903) La démocratie et l’organisation des partis politiques. Calmann-Levy, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Owen G, Grofman B, Feld S (1989) Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem. Math Soc Sci 17:1–16

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey Th, Srivastava S (1989) Mechanism design with incomplete information: a solution to the implementation problem. J Polit Econ 97:668–691

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richardson G (1998) The structure of fuzzy preferences: social choice implications. Soc Choice Welfare 15:359–369

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Risse M (2005) Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet. Soc Choice Welfare 25:95–113

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Roubens M (1996) Choice procedures in fuzzy multicriterion decision analysis based on pairwise comparisons. Fuzzy Sets Syst 84: 135–142

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Saari D (2006) Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?. Soc Choice Welfare 26:107–129

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategyproofness and Arrow’s conditions. J Econ Theory 10:187–217

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Skala H (1978) Arrow’s impossibility theorem: some new aspects. In: Gottinger H, Leinfellner W (eds) Decision theory and social ethics. D. Reidel, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Tijs S, Brânzei R, Ishihara S, Muto S (2004) On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games. Fuzzy Sets Syst 146:285–296

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Todhunter I (1865) A history of the mathematical theory of probability from the time of Pascal to that of Laplace. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Young HP (1988) Condorcet’s theory of voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 82:1231–1244

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hannu Nurmi.

Additional information

The author wishes to thank—without implicating—Didier Dubois, Javier Montero and Rudolf Seising for useful comments on an earlier draft.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Nurmi, H. Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect. Soft Comput 12, 281–288 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-007-0196-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-007-0196-5

Keywords

Navigation