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Analyzing a nail-biting election

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Abstract.

Using Brams and Fishburn's report and data, the SC&W election is analyzed with an emphasis on explaining the theoretical reasons for the conflicting outcomes. In the process, some new results are obtained.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and of Mathematics, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA 92717-5100, USA (e-mail: dsaari@uci.edu), , , , , , US

    Donald G. Saari

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  1. Donald G. Saari
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Received: 20 June 2000/Accepted: 26 March 2001

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Saari, D. Analyzing a nail-biting election. Soc Choice Welfare 18, 415–430 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100136

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100136

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