Abstract.
A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between various axioms in this context. They are: agreement, separability, population solidarity, consistency, converse consistency, and population-and-cost solidarity. Also, on the basis of these axioms, we present alternative characterizations of egalitarian solutions; each solution assigns to each agent an equal share of the surplus derived from the public project over some reference utility level, but uses a different method to compute the reference utility level.
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Received: 18 May 1998/Accepted: 1 July 1999
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Chun, Y. Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 507–521 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050175
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050175