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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 615–627 | Cite as

The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

  • Murat R. Sertel
  • Bilge Yılmaz

Abstract.

It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is “majoritarian approving” i.e. it always picks “what's good for a majority” (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better “effective” half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Strict Preference Preference Profile Strict Majority Majoritarian Compromise 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Murat R. Sertel
    • 1
  • Bilge Yılmaz
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Economic Design, Boğaziçi University, TR-80815 İstanbul, Turkey (e-mail: msertel@turk.net)TR
  2. 2.Finance Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USAUS

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