Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: Some characterizations

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

Consider an agent with fuzzy preferences. This agent, however, has to make exact choices when faced with different feasible sets of alternatives. What rule does he follow in making such choices? This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a class of binary choice rules called the α satisfying rule. When α=1, this rule is the Orlovsky choice rule. On the other hand, for α≤1/2, the rule coincides with the M α rule that has been extensively analyzed in the literature on fuzzy preferences.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CESP, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, , , , , , IN

    Kunal Sengupta

Authors
  1. Kunal Sengupta
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Received: 3 August 1995/Accepted: 19 November 1997

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Sengupta, K. Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: Some characterizations. Soc Choice Welfare 16, 259–272 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050143

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050143

Keywords

Search

Navigation