Skip to main content
Log in

Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem

  • Article
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

I show that the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Arrow's impossibility theorem can be weakened into Relational Independent Decisiveness. The condition of Relational Independent Decisiveness is essentially a translation of Sen's Independent Decisiveness into the traditional Arrovian framework. I also show by example that Relational Independent Decisiveness is indeed weaker than Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received: 30 October 1996 / Accepted: 22 May 1997

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Denicolò, V. Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 563–566 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050124

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050124

Keywords

Navigation