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Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

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Abstract.

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise between these two extremes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IMW, University of Bielefeld, Postfach 10 01 31, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany, , , , , , DE

    Anke Gerber

  2. Department of Economics and IVIE, University of Alicante, E-03080 Alicante, Spain, , , , , , ES

    Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin

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  1. Anke Gerber
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  2. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin
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Received: 28 May 1996 / Accepted: 5 February 1997

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Gerber, A., Ortuno-Ortin, I. Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 445–454 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050116

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050116

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