Abstract.
Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Received: 9 June 1995/Accepted: 8 January 1996
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schummer, J. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies. Soc Choice Welfare 14, 47–56 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050