Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 50, Issue 1, pp 101–122 | Cite as

Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods

  • Nhan-Tam Nguyen
  • Dorothea Baumeister
  • Jörg Rothe
Original Paper
  • 141 Downloads

Abstract

We study strategy-proofness in a model of resource allocation due to Brams and King (Ration Soc 17:387–421, 2005) and Brams et al. (Theory Decis 55:147–180, 2003), further developed by Baumeister et al. (J Auton Agents Multi Agent Syst 31(3):628–655, 2017). We assume resources to be indivisible and nonshareable and that agents have responsive preferences over the power set of the resources, but only submit ordinal preferences over single resources to the social planner. Using scoring vectors, these ordinal preferences induce additive utility functions. We then focus on allocation correspondences that maximize utilitarian social welfare, and we use extension principles (from social choice theory, such as the Kelly and the Gärdenfors extension) for preferences to study manipulation of allocation correspondences. We characterize strategy-proofness of the utilitarian allocation correspondence: It is Gärdenfors/Kelly-strategy-proof if and only if the number of different values in the scoring vector is at most two or the number of occurrences of the greatest value in the scoring vector is larger than half the number of resources.

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous Social Choice and Welfare, IJCAI-2015, and COMSOC-2016 reviewers (of the earlier versions) for helpful comments and Jérôme Lang for interesting discussions and feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. This work was supported in part by the NRW Ministry for Innovation, Science, and Research and DFG Grants RO 1202/14-1, RO 1202/14-2, and RO 1202/15-1.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nhan-Tam Nguyen
    • 1
  • Dorothea Baumeister
    • 1
  • Jörg Rothe
    • 1
  1. 1.Heinrich-Heine-Universität DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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