Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 269–294 | Cite as

Conundrums for nonconsequentialists

Original Paper


There are a number of single-profile impossibility theorems in social choice theory and welfare economics that demonstrate the incompatibility of unanimity/dominance criteria with various nonconsequentialist principles given some rationality restrictions on the rankings being considered. This article is concerned with examining what they have in common and how they differ. Groups of results are identified that have similar formal structures and are established using similar proof strategies.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departments of Economics and PhilosophyVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA

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