# A bargaining model of endogenous procedures

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## Abstract

This paper endogenizes policymaking procedures in a multilateral bargaining framework. A procedure specifies players’ proposal power in bargaining over one-dimensional policies. In procedural bargaining players internalize the procedures’ effects on subsequent policy bargaining. In policy bargaining players’ utilities are continuous, strictly concave, and order-restricted. The paper provides equilibrium characterization, existence, and uniqueness results for this two-tier bargaining model. Although the procedural choice set is multidimensional, sequentially rational procedures feature “limited power sharing” and admit a total order. In equilibrium, endogenous procedures and policies are strategic complements.

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