Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 985–1012 | Cite as

A bargaining model of endogenous procedures

  • Daniel Diermeier
  • Carlo Prato
  • Razvan VlaicuEmail author
Original Paper


This paper endogenizes policymaking procedures in a multilateral bargaining framework. A procedure specifies players’ proposal power in bargaining over one-dimensional policies. In procedural bargaining players internalize the procedures’ effects on subsequent policy bargaining. In policy bargaining players’ utilities are continuous, strictly concave, and order-restricted. The paper provides equilibrium characterization, existence, and uniqueness results for this two-tier bargaining model. Although the procedural choice set is multidimensional, sequentially rational procedures feature “limited power sharing” and admit a total order. In equilibrium, endogenous procedures and policies are strategic complements.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Office of the Provost, and Harris School of Public PolicyUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA
  2. 2.Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)TorontoCanada
  3. 3.Department of Political ScienceColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA
  4. 4.Research DepartmentInter-American Development BankWashingtonUSA

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