Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 959–971 | Cite as

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction

Original Paper


We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economics, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, and Centre for Competition PolicyUniversity of East AngliaNorwichUK
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of CincinnatiCincinnatiUSA

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