Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 939–957 | Cite as

Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests

  • Jingfeng LuEmail author
  • Zhewei Wang
Original Paper


The reverse nested lottery contest proposed by Fu et al. (2014) is the “mirror image” of the classical nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a), which has been axiomatized by Lu and Wang (2015). In this paper, we close the gap and provide an axiomatic underpinning for the reverse nested lottery contest by identifying a set of six necessary and sufficient axioms. These axioms proposed specify the properties of contestants’ probabilities of being ranked the lowest among all players or within subgroups, while the axiomatization of the classical nested lottery contest by Lu and Wang (2015) relies on axioms on contestants’ probabilities of being ranked the highest among all players or within subgroups.


Ranking Outcome Reverse Model Contest Success Function Impact Function Effort Entry 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsNational University of SingaporeSingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.School of Economics, Williamson Centre for Law, Economics, and OrganizationShandong UniversityJinanChina

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