# Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests

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## Abstract

The *reverse *nested lottery contest proposed by Fu et al. (2014) is the “mirror image” of the classical nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a), which has been axiomatized by Lu and Wang (2015). In this paper, we close the gap and provide an axiomatic underpinning for the *reverse *nested lottery contest by identifying a set of six necessary and sufficient axioms. These axioms proposed specify the properties of contestants’ probabilities of being ranked the* lowest* among all players or within subgroups, while the axiomatization of the classical nested lottery contest by Lu and Wang (2015) relies on axioms on contestants’ probabilities of being ranked the *highest* among all players or within subgroups.

## Keywords

Ranking Outcome Reverse Model Contest Success Function Impact Function Effort Entry## References

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