Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 46, Issue 4, pp 777–809

Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x

Cite this article as:
Driesen, B. Soc Choice Welf (2016) 46: 777. doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x
  • 115 Downloads

Abstract

We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (Econ Lett 73:131–136, 2001), and using methods of Imai (Econometrica 51:389–401, 1983), extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, J Econ Theory 45:330–341, 1988), by making the notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem change relative to the original problem.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business SchoolGlasgowUK

Personalised recommendations