Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 745–763

Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2

Cite this article as:
İnal, H. Soc Choice Welf (2015) 45: 745. doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2

Abstract

In coalition formation games where agents have preferences over coalitions to which they belong, the set of fixed points of an operator and the core of coalition formation games coincide. An acyclicity condition on preference profiles guarantees the existence of a unique core. An algorithm using that operator finds all core partitions whenever there exists one.

JEL Classification

C78 C71 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of International Trade and Financeİzmir UniversityİzmirTurkey

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