Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 44, Issue 2, pp 433–455 | Cite as

Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

  • Thierry Marchant
  • Debasis Mishra


We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. In unbounded domains, if we replace our range condition by an independence condition, then every implementable allocation rule is an affine maximizer. Our results extend Roberts’ affine maximizer theorem (Roberts, In: Laffont J-J (ed) The characterization of implementable choice rules, 1979) to the case of two alternatives.



We are extremely grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Benny Moldovanu, Anup Pramanik, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, and Dries Vermulen, and two anonymous referees for useful comments and discussions.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ghent UniversityGhentBelgium
  2. 2.Indian Statistical InstituteNew DelhiIndia

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