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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 44, Issue 2, pp 301–318 | Cite as

Revealed norm obedience

  • Andreas Tutić Email author
Article
  • 383 Downloads

Abstract

We study a rational decision maker who obeys social norms. In our setup norms prescribe choices in some decision problems. The decision maker obeys norms in situations to which they apply and otherwise maximizes her preference relation. We characterize the class of choice functions that can be explained by this decision procedure, relate this procedure to other decision procedures in the literature, and engage in welfare considerations.

Keywords

Decision Maker Social Norm Decision Problem Decision Procedure Maximal Element 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität LeipzigLeipzigGermany

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