Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 603–633 | Cite as

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

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Abstract

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultad de EconomíaUniversidad de Los AndesBogotáColombia
  2. 2.Facultad de EconomíaUniversidad del RosarioBogotáColombia
  3. 3.Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSEBarcelonaSpain

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