Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 647–658 | Cite as

Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

  • Ville KorpelaEmail author
Original Paper


We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, 2012) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems

JEL Classification

C72 D71 D78 



Early version of this paper was presented at the 23rd Stony Brook Summer Festival on Game Theory. I thank the participants for comments. I also wish to thank the referee and the editor for detecting few errors and for comments that have greatly improved the quality of this paper. Financial support from the Academy of Finland, Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, OP-Pohjola Group Research Foundation and Emil Aaltonen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Public Choice Research Centre (PCRC) and Turku School of Economics (TSE)University of TurkuTurkuFinland
  2. 2.Turku School of Economics TurkuFinland

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