Abstract
There exist social choice rules for which every manipulation benefits everyone. This paper constructs a large variety of rules with this property and provides two characterizations of such rules.
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Notes
For these examples, we thank Malte Lierl and Asha Sundaram.
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Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S. Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization. Soc Choice Welf 43, 329–355 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7