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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 39, Issue 4, pp 869–889 | Cite as

Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis

  • Susumu CatoEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity.

Keywords

Social Choice Social Preference Econ Theory Social Choice Theory Impossibility Theorem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceUniversity of TokyoBunkyo-ku, TokyoJapan

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