Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
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This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity.
KeywordsSocial Choice Social Preference Econ Theory Social Choice Theory Impossibility Theorem
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