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A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi’s (‘impartial’) observer

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Abstract

We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare function in the context of Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi’s setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may assume independent of the social alternative.

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Correspondence to Simon Grant.

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Grant, S., Kajii, A., Polak, B. et al. A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi’s (‘impartial’) observer. Soc Choice Welf 39, 833–846 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0563-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0563-0

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