Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp 431–454 | Cite as

Quaternary dichotomous voting rules

  • Annick LaruelleEmail author
  • Federico Valenciano
Original Paper


In this article, we provide a general model of “quaternary” dichotomous voting rules (QVRs), namely, voting rules for making collective dichotomous decisions (to accept or reject a proposal), based on vote profiles in which four options are available to each voter: voting (“yes”, “no”, or “abstaining”) or staying home and not turning out. The model covers most of actual real-world dichotomus rules, where quorums are often required, and some of the extensions considered in the literature. In particular, we address and solve the question of the representability of QVRs by means of weighted rules and extend the notion of “dimension” of a rule.


Vote Rule Weighted Vote Monotonicity Condition Weighted Rule Linear Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IUniversidad del País VascoBilbaoSpain
  2. 2.IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation of ScienceBilbaoSpain
  3. 3.Departamento de Economía Aplicada IVUniversidad del País VascoBilbaoSpain

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