Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 38, Issue 2, pp 237–246 | Cite as

A generalization of Campbell and Kelly’s trade-off theorem

  • Susumu Cato
  • Yohei SekiguchiEmail author
Original Paper


This article considers social choice theory without the Pareto principle. We revisit the trade-off theorem developed by Campbell and Kelly (Econometrica 61:1355–1365, 1993) and generalize their result. By introducing an alternative measure of decisive structure, a dominance relation, we show that if a social welfare function dominates another social welfare function, then the number of pairs of alternatives which social ranking is independently of individual preferences under the former is not more than that under the latter. Moreover, we offer two applications of our main result.


Social Choice Dominance Relation Econ Theory Social Welfare Function Social Ranking 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Graduate School of EconomicsUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan

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