Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 267–303

A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4

Cite this article as:
Schulze, M. Soc Choice Welf (2011) 36: 267. doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4


In recent years, the Pirate Party of Sweden, the Wikimedia Foundation, the Debian project, the “Software in the Public Interest” project, the Gentoo project, and many other private organizations adopted a new single-winner election method for internal elections and referendums. In this article, we will introduce this method, demonstrate that it satisfies, e.g., resolvability, Condorcet, Pareto, reversal symmetry, monotonicity, and independence of clones and present an O(C^3) algorithm to calculate the winner, where C is the number of alternatives.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BerlinGermany

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