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Rules for aggregating information

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Abstract

We present a model of information aggregation in which agents’ information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail Code 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91125, USA

    Christopher P. Chambers

  2. Faculty of Law and Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, 31905, Israel

    Alan D. Miller

Authors
  1. Christopher P. Chambers
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  2. Alan D. Miller
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Correspondence to Alan D. Miller.

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Chambers, C.P., Miller, A.D. Rules for aggregating information. Soc Choice Welf 36, 75–82 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5

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