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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 49–74 | Cite as

A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees

  • Daniel J. SeidmannEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

We compare play in private and public committees when insiders care both about how well the committee decision serves organizational goals, and about the rewards which outsiders give for representing their interests. We show that a private committee reaches decisions which better serve organizational goals than either a public committee or the median insider choosing alone; and that a committee can only exhibit a norm of consensus if insiders vote in private. Finally, any insider who does not vote for a private committee’s decision must vote for a decision which better serves organizational goals; whereas a dissident in a public committee votes for a decision which worse serves organizational goals.

Keywords

Organizational Goal Vote Game Vote Pattern Public Committee Binary Issue 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsNottingham UniversityNottinghamEngland

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