Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Voces populi and the art of listening

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favourite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles allowing the strategic use of a given cyclic profile. Theorems 2, 3 and 4 establish conditions for an anonymous and neutral 3-candidate single-seat election to be monotonic and still avoid this strategy completely. Plurality elections combine these properties; among the others ‘conditional IRV’ gives the strongest challenge to the plurality winner. Conditional IRV is extended to any number of candidates. Theorem 5 is an impossibility of Gibbard–Satterthwaite type, describing three specific strategies that cannot all be avoided in meaningful anonymous and neutral election methods.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alvarez RM, Boehmke FJ, Nagler J (2006) Strategic voting in British elections. Elect Stud 25: 1–19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, Cowles Foundation Monograph 12. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin JM (1926) The technique of the Nanson preferential majority system of election. Proc R Soc Vic n.s.39: 42–52

    Google Scholar 

  • Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (2003) Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting. In: Annual meeting of the American political association

  • Burden BC (2003) Minor parties in the 2000 presidential election. In: Weisberg HF, Wilcox C (eds) Models of voting in presidential elections: the 2000 U.S. election. Stanford University Press, Stanford

    Google Scholar 

  • Caillaud B, Tirole J (2002) Parties as political intermediaries. Q J Econ 117: 1453–1489

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carey C (2003) http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-December/011508.html

  • Cox GW (1997) Making votes count. Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dowding K, van Hees M (2007) In praise of manipulation. Br J Polit Sci 38: 1–17

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett MAE (1998) The Borda count and agenda manipulation. Social Choice Welf 15: 289–296

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Emerson P (2007) Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Springer, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gehrlein WV (2006) Condorcet’s paradox. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41: 587–601

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartvigsen D (2006) Vote trading in public elections. Math Soc Sci 52: 31–48

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hägele G, Pukelsheim F (2001) Llull’s writings on electoral systems. Stud Llulliana 41: 3–38

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill ID (2001) Difficulties with equality of preference. Voting Matters issue 13: 8–9

    Google Scholar 

  • McLean I (1990) The Borda and Condorcet principles: three medieval applications. Soc Choice Welf 7: 99–108

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Myatt DP (2007) On the theory of strategic voting. Rev Econ Stud 74: 255–281

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanson EJ (1882) Methods of election. Trans Proc R Soc Vic 18: 197–240

    Google Scholar 

  • Ng Y-K (1981) Welfarism: a defence against Sen’s attack. Econ J 91: 531–535

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pande R (2003) Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? theory and evidence from India. Am Econ Rev 93: 1132–1151

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reilly B (2002a) Electoral systems for divided societies, vol 13. Johns Hopkins University Press, Balltimore, pp 156–170

  • Reilly B (2002b) Social choice in the south seas: electoral innovation and the Borda count in the Pacific Island countries. Int Polit Sci Rev 23: 355–372

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saari DG (1994) Geometry of voting, Studies in economic theory 3. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Saari DG (2003) Unsettling aspects of voting theory. Econ Theory 22: 529–555

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Satterthwaite MA (1975) Strategy proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10: 187–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1977) Social choice theory: a re-examination. Econometrica 45: 53–89

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1979) Personal utilities and public judgements: or what’s with welfare economics. Econ J 89: 537–558

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1981) A reply to ‘welfarism: a defence against Sen’s attack’. Econ J 91: 531–535

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1999a) The possibility of social choice. Am Econ Rev 89: 349–378

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1999b) Democracy as a universal value. J Democr 10.3: 3–17

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stensholt E (1996) Circle pictograms for vote vectors. SIAM Rev 38: 96–116

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stensholt E (2002) Nonmonotonicity in AV. Voting Matters, issue 15: 5–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Stensholt E (2004) Single transferable votes with tax cuts. SIAM Rev 46: 417–442

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stensholt E (2007) Elections in split societies (Review). Voting Matters, issue 24: 47–56

    Google Scholar 

  • Tideman N (1995) The single transferable vote. J Econ Perspect 9: 27–38

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber RJ (1995) Approval Voting. J Econ Perspect 9: 39–49

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodall DR (1996) Monotonicity and single-seat election rules. Voting Matters, issue 6: 9–14

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, 5045, Bergen, Norway

    Eivind Stensholt

Authors
  1. Eivind Stensholt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Eivind Stensholt.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Stensholt, E. Voces populi and the art of listening. Soc Choice Welf 35, 291–317 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0442-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0442-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation