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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 267–284 | Cite as

Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

  • Susumu CatoEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle.

Keywords

Social Choice Social Preference Econ Theory Social Choice Theory Veto Power 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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