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Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’

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Abstract

Saari (Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes, 2008) well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. This note illustrates the relevance of these explanations in justifying the ‘metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion’.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel

    Shmuel Nitzan

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  1. Shmuel Nitzan
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Correspondence to Shmuel Nitzan.

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Nitzan, S. Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’. Soc Choice Welf 35, 25–28 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0424-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0424-2

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