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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 34, Issue 4, pp 611–630 | Cite as

Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

  • Susumu CatoEmail author
  • Daisuke Hirata
Original Paper

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided.

Keywords

Binary Relation Social Preference Econ Theory Collective Rationality Social Choice Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Graduate School of EconomicsThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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