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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 487–496 | Cite as

Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context

  • José Luis García-Lapresta
  • A. A. J. Marley
  • Miguel Martínez-Panero
Original Paper

Abstract

An increasing body of theoretical and empirical work on discrete choice considers a choice design in which a person is asked to select both the best and the worst alternative in an available set of alternatives, in contrast to more traditional tasks, such as where the person is asked to: select the best alternative; select the worst alternative; rank the alternatives. Here we consider voting systems motivated by such “best–worst” choice; characterize a class of “best–worst” voting systems in terms of a set of axioms in the context of scoring rules; and discuss briefly possible extensions to approval–disapproval systems.

Keywords

Econ Theory Vote System Discrete Choice Experiment Social Choice Function Approval Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • José Luis García-Lapresta
    • 1
  • A. A. J. Marley
    • 2
    • 3
  • Miguel Martínez-Panero
    • 1
  1. 1.PRESAD Research Group, Department of Applied EconomicsUniversity of ValladolidValladolidSpain
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyUniversity of VictoriaVictoriaCanada
  3. 3.Centre for the Study of ChoiceUniversity of TechnologySydneyAustralia

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