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Social Choice and Welfare

, 33:617 | Cite as

Liberal political equality implies proportional representation

  • Eliora van der Hout
  • Anthony J. McGann
Open Access
Original Paper

Abstract

This article shows that for a single-vote electoral system for a representative body to treat all voters and all parties equally, it must produce results essentially identical to list proportional representation (PR). Democratic theory has often been agnostic concerning representative institutions. Different institutions have been compared in terms of behavioral outcomes rather than axiomatic properties. Building on van der Hout (Annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Diego, 2002) result, we show that for an electoral system to completely respect the principle of liberal political equality and popular sovereignty, its results must be equivalent to those of list PR.

Keywords

Electoral System Vote Rule Allocation Rule Vote Share Proportional Representation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Open Access

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universiteit van TilburgTilburgThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of GovernmentUniversity of EssexColchesterUK
  3. 3.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaIrvineUSA

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