Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a sufficient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a fixed budget has to be allocated among several pure public goods.
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We would like to express our deepest gratitude to our referee for an extremely careful and detailed report. His/her challenging questions did force us to be more acute on the scope of validity and the limits of our result. We would like also to thank Bernardo Moreno for pointing out a mistake in the statement of Theorem 1 as it was formulated in an earlier version and for sending a copy of his joint work with Barbera et al. (2008). This is the only one paper we know of, offering an alternative systematic analysis of the question explored in our paper.
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Le Breton, M., Zaporozhets, V. On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties. Soc Choice Welf 33, 287–309 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0358-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0358-0