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Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An impartial spectator analysis of justice

Social Choice and Welfare volume 33, pages 101–127 (2009)Cite this article

Abstract

A popular sentiment is that fairness is inexorably subjective and incapable of being determined by objective standards. This study, on the other hand, seeks to establish evidence on unbiased justice and to propose and demonstrate a general approach for measuring impartial views empirically. Most normative justice theories associate impartiality with limited information and consensus. In both the normative and positive literature, information is usually seen as the raw material for self-serving bias and disagreement. In contrast, this paper proposes a type of impartiality that is associated with a high level of information and that results in consensus. The crucial distinction is the emphasis here on the views of impartial spectators, rather than implicated stakeholders. I describe the quasi-spectator method, i.e., an empirical means to approximate the views of impartial spectators. Results of a questionnaire provide evidence on quasi-spectator views and support this approach as a means to elicit moral preferences. By establishing a relationship between consensus and impartiality, this paper helps lay an empirical foundation for welfare analysis, social choice theory and practical policy applications.

“There is no objective standard of ‘fairness.’ ‘Fairness’ is strictly in the eye of the beholder... To a producer or seller, a ‘fair’ price is a high price. To the buyer or consumer, a ‘fair’ price is a low price. How is the conflict to be adjudicated?” – Milton Friedman, Newsweek, July 4, 1977.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, One LMU Drive, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, CA, 90045, USA

    James Konow

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  1. James Konow
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Correspondence to James Konow.

Additional information

I thank an editor and two referees of this journal, Kjell Arne Brekke, Joseph Earley, Marco Faravelli, Christel Fricke, Wulf Gaertner, Andrew Healy, Astri Hole, Bertil Tungodden, participants at the Workshop on Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action at the University of Oslo and at the plenary session on experimental philosophy at the 2007 North American meetings of the Economic Science Association for their helpful comments and suggestions. I retain sole responsibility, of course, for any shortcomings.

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Konow, J. Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An impartial spectator analysis of justice. Soc Choice Welf 33, 101–127 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0348-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0348-2

Keywords

  • Moral Judgment
  • Distributive Justice
  • Pulp Mill
  • Social Choice Theory
  • Moral View