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Uncovered set choice rules

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Abstract

I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a total asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the choice set coincides with the uncovered set of T restricted to that feasible set. This notion of ‘maximization’ offers testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, London, E1 4NS, England

    Michele Lombardi

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  1. Michele Lombardi
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Correspondence to Michele Lombardi.

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Lombardi, M. Uncovered set choice rules. Soc Choice Welfare 31, 271–279 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0281-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0281-9

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