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Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

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Abstract

This paper describes the correspondences between the results given by backward induction (BI) and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) in binary voting agendas with sequential voting. When the voters have strict preferences over all candidates, the strategies that survive IEWDS all select the unique candidate selected by the BI strategy profiles. But if some voters are indifferent, this result no longer holds. However, when there are only two candidates, it is possible to demonstrate strong relationships between the results given by BI and IEWDS, even when some voters have indifferences.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA

    Patrick Hummel

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  1. Patrick Hummel
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Correspondence to Patrick Hummel.

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Hummel, P. Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting. Soc Choice Welfare 31, 257–269 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4

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