Abstract
In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule, and (c) if the size of the electorate is greater than three, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.
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I thank Jordi Massó for his supervision and his never-ending encouragement. Miguel-Ángel Ballester showed me how to improve on earlier drafts of the paper. Salvador Barberà, Carmen Bevía, Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers, Alejandro Neme, Shmuel Nitzan and Yves Sprumont helped me a lot with their comments. All remaining errors are mine. This research was undertaken with support from the fellowship 2001FI 00451 of the Generalitat de Catalunya and from the research grant BEC2002-02130 of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain while I have been a graduate student at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
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Vorsatz, M. Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 31, 151–162 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0270-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0270-z