Abstract
This note sharpens the result of Nandeibam (J Econ Theory 68:212–233, 1996). We show that a stochastic social choice function which satisfies regularity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak ex-post Pareto optimality is essentially a weak random dictatorship.
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References
Arrow KJ (1951) Social choice and individual values. 2nd edn, 1963. Wiley New York
Nandeibam S (1996) Coalitional power structure in stochastic social choice functions with an unrestricted preference domain. J Econ Theory 68:212–233
Pattanaik PK, Peleg B (1986) Distribution of power under stochastic social choice rules. Econometrica 54:909–921
Rockafellar TR (1970) Convex analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton
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Nandeibam, S. A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions. Soc Choice Welfare 30, 447–455 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5