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Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem

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Abstract

A set of jobs need to be served by a server which can serve only one job at a time. Every job has a processing time and incurs cost due to waiting (linear in its waiting time). The jobs share their costs using monetary transfers. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value solution for this problem.

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Correspondence to Debasis Mishra.

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Mishra, D., Rangarajan, B. Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 369–382 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0210-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0210-3

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