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The Moulin–Shenker rule

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Abstract

The Moulin–Shenker rule is a non-linear solution concept for solving heterogeneous cost sharing problems. It is the unique continuous rule with the properties scale invariance, bounds on cost shares and self-consistency.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Quantitative Economics, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Maurice Koster

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  1. Maurice Koster
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Correspondence to Maurice Koster.

Additional information

I am indebted to several anonymous referees and especially to Hervé Moulin for many useful suggestions.

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Koster, M. The Moulin–Shenker rule. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 271–293 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0206-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0206-z

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