Abstract
We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.
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Gordon, S. Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 125–147 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0198-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0198-8