Abstract
For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow’s IIA.
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Campbell DE, Kelly JS (2000) Information and preference aggregation. Soc Choice Welfare 17:3–24
Campbell DE, Kelly JS (2002) Impossibility theorems in the Arrovian framework. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 35–94
Campbell DE, Kelly JS (2006) Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not IIA. Soc Choice Welfare (this issue)
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Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S. Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 83–104 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z