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Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives

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Abstract

For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow’s IIA.

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References

  • Campbell DE, Kelly JS (2000) Information and preference aggregation. Soc Choice Welfare 17:3–24

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  • Campbell DE, Kelly JS (2006) Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not IIA. Soc Choice Welfare (this issue)

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Correspondence to Jerry S. Kelly.

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Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S. Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 83–104 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z

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