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Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

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Abstract

In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, 23187-8795, USA

    Donald E. Campbell

  2. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 13245-1090, USA

    Jerry S. Kelly

Authors
  1. Donald E. Campbell
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  2. Jerry S. Kelly
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Correspondence to Donald E. Campbell.

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Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S. Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 69–82 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0193-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0193-0

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