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Equal representation in two-tier voting systems

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Abstract

The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte–Carlo simulations. Penrose’s square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel

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  1. Nicola Maaser
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  2. Stefan Napel
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Correspondence to Stefan Napel.

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Maaser, N., Napel, S. Equal representation in two-tier voting systems. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 401–420 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0186-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0186-z

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