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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 41–60 | Cite as

Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU

  • Francesco Passarelli
  • Jason Barr
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64–p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting “yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.

Keywords

European Union Power Index Vote System Coalition Formation Agendum Setter 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Coste Sant’ Agostino, DTSOUniversity of TeramoTeramoItaly
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsRutgers UniversityNewarkUSA

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