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A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting

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Abstract

This note provides a characterization of Approval Voting as the only ballot aggregation function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation. The proof is simpler than those of the characterizations of Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences, 1978a; J Econ Theory 19:180–185, 1978b), and also shows that the assumption of Neutrality used there was unnecessary.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box D 150, 78457, Konstanz, Germany

    Carlos Alós-Ferrer

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  1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer
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Correspondence to Carlos Alós-Ferrer.

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Alós-Ferrer, C. A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 621–625 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0145-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0145-8

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