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The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T) and encompasses both the constrained equal-awards rule (A) and the constrained equal-losses rule (L). The family is defined by means of a parameter \(\theta \in [0,1]\) that can be interpreted as a measure of the distributive power of the rule. We provide a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the family and its connections with the existing literature.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad de Málaga and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Málaga, Spain

    Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

  2. Department of Economics, University of Alicante & IVIE, 03071, Alicante, Spain

    Antonio Villar

Authors
  1. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
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  2. Antonio Villar
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Correspondence to Antonio Villar.

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Moreno-Ternero, J.D., Villar, A. The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 231–249 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0121-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0121-3

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