Abstract
An axiomatic modeling approach to multi-issue debates is proposed. A debate is viewed as a decision procedure consisting of two stages: (1) an “argumentation rule” determines what arguments are admissible for each party, given the “raw data”, depending on the issue or set of issues under discussion; (2) a “persuasion rule” determines the strength of the admissible arguments and selects the winning party. Persuasion rules are characterized for various alternative specifications of the argumentation rule. These characterizations capture rhetorical effects that we sometimes encounter in real-life multi-issue debates.
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Spiegler, R. Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates. Soc Choice Welfare 26, 385–402 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0100-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0100-8