Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 285–304 | Cite as

A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games

Original Paper

Abstract

We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or “core”) point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of Humanities and Social SciencesCalifornia Institute of TechnologyPasadenaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Political Science and Department of EconomicsUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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